How We Know Our Minds: The Illusion of First-Person Knowledge of Intentionality

How We Know Our Minds: The Illusion of First-Person Knowledge of Intentionality

Gopnik, Alison
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16, no. 1 (1993): 1-14
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00028636

As adults all of us have a network of psychological beliefs. We believe that other people have beliefs, desires, intentions, and emotions and that these states lead to their actions. Moreover, we also believe that we ourselves have analogous beliefs and desires that are involved in our own decisions to act. And we believe, at least implicitly, that beliefs, desires, and so on are what philosophers would call “intentional” states; we believe that they are about the world. However, we also believe that our relations to our own beliefs and desires are different from our relations to those of others. We believe that we know our own beliefs and desires directly, but that we must infer the beliefs and desires of other people. Are we right?
— Alison Gopnik
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